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Abstract 
In this paper, we deal with inter-departmental conflicts such a s  
marketing-manufacturing conflict We show tha t  the  popular 
compensahon schemes such as  the ones based on each party's own 
performance and/or overall performance can not induce the Pareto- 
Optimal effort from participants. By making one party's reward 
dependent on the other party's performance in addition to its own and 
overall performances. we can induce each party to put the Pareto- 
Optimal effort. By constructing an appropnate compensation scheme, 
we can resolve the conflict between participating departments and 
induce optimal amount of cooperatwe effort. 
Keywords: mat-ketmg/operations Interface 
1. Introduction 
Within a firm, there  a re  usually several divisions or 
departments whose cooperation is essential for its success in the 
competitive business world. But it is not easy to induce the 
needed cooperation from all the participants. We will study a 
reward scheme which mitigates the inter-departmental conflicts. 
In this paper, we will focus on the conflicts between marketing 
and manufacturing divisions, a typical inter-departmental 
conflict. 
Compared with other pairs of functions, the marketing/ 
manufacturing interface tends to produce much more frequent 
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and heated disagreement (Hayes and Wheelwright ( 1984)). Some 
of the typical marketing-manufacturing conflicts are given in 
Table 1 I t  has been stressed that marketmg and manufacturing 
should be coordinated more effectively slnce they usually try to 
find each other's fault rather than working together for the 
corporate's goal. 
The areas of necessary cooperation but of potenbal conflict, 
causes of conflict, and the ways of managing the conflict by 
increasing cooperation and minimizing antagonism between the 
marketing and manufacturing functions were studied by 
Shapiro ( 1977). Shapiro gave eight marketing-manufacturing 
areas of necessary cooperation but of potential conflict, and 
recommended explicit policies, modified measurements, and 
people's concern as ways for reducing the conflict. In modified 
measurements, Shapiro gave a n  insightful suggestion that 
marketing managers should be judged on those variables 
important to the manufacturing operation and vlce versa. 
Rewarding marketing and manufacturing departments for 
pursuing opposite goals and evaluating major conflict areas 
between these two departments were studied by Crittenden 
(1992), and Crittenden e t  al. (1993). Conflict reduction 
mechanisms such as  organizational design, evaluation and 
reward systems, communication, and models were suggested. 
Through empincal studies, several mechmsms have also been 
Table 1. Examples of Marketing-Manufacturing Conflict 
Marketmg Department Manufactunng Department 
Customlzahon for niche markets Standarduahon for economy of 
scale or quality consistency 
Cost up d needed for quahty improvement Reduclng unit cost of produchon 
Facility layout for customer convenience Facllity layout for cost 
and semce efficiency 
Mamtammg surplus capacity for Reducing capacity idleness 
quick response to customers 
Keeplng high mventory for customer semce Reducmg Inventory level 
Promohng new product development Opposing expenslve design changes 
Full h e  of products Small number of products for 
manufactumg efficiency 
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suggested to improve coordination among groups with 
conflicting responsibilities by John and Hall (1991). The R&D/ 
marketing interface was studied by Souder and Chakrabarti 
(1978). Souder and Chakrabarti cited the factors causing conflict 
among organizational subuni t s  a s  follows: mutual  t ask  
dependency, task-related asymmetry, differences m criteria for 
reward, functional specialization, dependence on common 
resources, and arnbiguihes in role descriptions and expectations 
for these units. As one of the ways to resolve the conflict, they 
suggested a jolnt reward system in which R&D and marketing 
share equally in the rewards from a successful effort and its 
effect was shown to be statistically significant. Bushman et al. 
(1995) empirically investigated the use of aggregate financial 
performance criteria measured at an organizahonal level higher 
than a manager's business unit. 
Coordination in vertical channels of distribution was studied 
by Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987). In their settmg, there exist a 
distributor and a manufacturer, and the manufacturer works as 
the leader in Stackelberg game. Products are delivered over a 
season to the distnbutor who can vary its processing rate. The 
manufacturer can decide its production rate dunng the season. 
Policies of the distnbutor and the manufacturer, and contractual 
price within the channel were derived using optimal control 
theory. Porteus and Whang (1991) used a specific multi-product 
newsvendor model of a firm with one marketing manager per 
product, a single manufacturing manager, and stochastic 
manufactunng capacity. Each reallzation of capacity must be 
allocated to produchon of the various stock levels. Effort by the 
manufactunng manager affects the available capacity and that 
by the marketing managers affects the stochastic demand. 
Porteus and Whang suggested incentive mechanisms inducing 
the Pareto-Optimal solution But in their model, the effort of 
each participant (manufactunng manager and several product 
managers) was one-dimensional in the sense that no cooperative 
effort needed between manufacturing and marketing was 
explicitly incorporated. 
Quantity discount pricing between two parties (the buyer and 
the supplier) having incentive conflicts was studied by many 
researchers (Lee and Rosenblatt (1986), Kohli and Park (1989), 
and Weng (1995)). And inventory control policy for multi-echelon 
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system where one party is thought to represent each tier in the 
system was extensively studied by Clark, Scarf, and many 
others. One of the representative paper in this area is Clark and 
Scarf (1960). 
In this paper, we analyze several linear reward mechanisms 
which induce distinct outputs. Specifically we suggest a linear 
compensation mechanism which induces the Pareto-Optimal 
output. The problem of inducing optimal effort when one party's 
effort influences output of the other, has  been extensively 
studied in the principal-agent theory. Our focus in this paper is 
on the case where two participating departments affect the 
performance of each other and the firm's overall performance. 
Although we will focus on marketing-manufacturing conflicts, 
we can apply our analysis to any two interacting parties such as 
R&D and manufacturing. R&D and marketing, or fashion 
designer and garment manufacturer. The a reas  a re  not 
restricted to the divisions within a company either. The conflict, 
for example, between a car maker and parts supplier regarding 
price, quality, cost, on-time delivery and so on can also be 
reduced by our method. 
Considering i t s  practical and academic significance, 
interdepartmental conflicts have not yet been studied rigorously. 
We thus construct a model of compensation scheme by which we 
attempt to solve the inter-departmental conflicts. After deriving 
optimal compensation scheme, we provide a numerical example. 
Then we apply our analysis to the prevlous models dealing with 
coordination among multiple participants. Finally practical 
implications and concluding remarks follow. 
2. Notations and Assumptions 
It is assumed that marketing and manufacturing departments 
are  the  only two part icipants in  a firm. Marketing and  
manufacturing departments are denoted by 1 and 2 respectively. 
The effort by marketing department is represented by (el ,, el,), 
where ell is the marketing department's effort put for increasing 
its own performance and e12 is the marketing department's 
cooperative effort for the other party (i.e. manufacturing 
department). The latter effort, e,,, is helpful for increasing 
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manufacturing department's performance and the fum's overall 
ou tpu t .  Likewise, e,, and e,, a re  the  manufacturing 
department's effort for marketing department and for itself 
respectively. We can cite several examples for e,. Marketing 
department's effort for increasing sales amount and customer 
satisfaction may be examples of e l l .  And marketing 
department's effort to rapidly transmit demand/sales data to 
manufacturing depar tment  can  be el, s ince i t  helps 
manufacturing set optimal production schedule and control 
inventory. As for e,, we can  th ink of manufacturing 
department's effort to control production schedule optimally. 
Interrupting a normal production schedule in order to meet 
marketing's rush orders may be a n  example of e,,, where 
manufacturing's effort increases marketing's performance. 
We denote Jell, e,,, el,, e,,) a s  the firm's overall output. And 
V, and V, are the performance measures for marketing and 
manufacturing departments respectively. We should note that V, 
is not necessarily represented by monetary terms. For example, 
V, may be annual sales amount, profitability, market share, or 
line breadth of products. And V2 may include annual mean 
inventory level, manufacturing cost, production output rate, 
manufacturing lead-time, ratio of achieving budget level. We 
model both Vl and V, as functions: 
The first function above tells u s  that marketing department's 
performance is determined by its own effort for itself and the 
cooperatwe effort from the other department. The same applies 
to the performance measure of manufacturing department, V,. 
We have cost functions for each department,  C, and C2 
respectively, and the domain for C, is  (e l l ,  el,). That is,  
marketing department's cost is determined by the effort for its 
own performance and i t s  cooperative effort for the  
manufacturing department. Likewise, C2 is a function of (e,,, 
e,,) to R+. We can also think of a special case of cost function 
where each department's effort incurs idenhcal cost regardless 
of whether it is for its own or for the other department. In this 
case, the cost functions should be of the form: Cl(ell + el,) and 
G(e22 + e21). 
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The followmgs are assumed for detailed analysis: 
f and V, are concave, and C, is convex 
f, V,, and  C ,  2 0 ,  and they are  twice continuously 
differenhable 
The functional forms ofJ V,, and C, are known. 
The objectives of marketing and  manufacturing 
departments are Increasing thelr own net benefits. 
af/ae, > 0 for L, J = (1 ,  2 )  That is, the overall output of the 
firm is increasing mth respect to the effort component. We 
should note especially that af/ae12 > 0 and af/ae2, > 0 
avl(ell, ezl)/aell >O and aVl(ell, e2,)/ae2, > 0 Likewse the 
first order partial denvatives of V2 wth  respect to the first 
and the second vanable are positwe 
acl(el,, e12)/aell > 0 and aCl(ell, e12)/ae12 > 0 Likewse 
the first order partial derivahves of C2 mth  respect to the 
first and the second variable are posihve 
Thus in our model, the interdependency between markehng- 
manufacturing is denoted by the influence of eg ( l  f 31 on the 
other department's performance, 5. Also those efforts are 
needed to improve the other department's performance as well 
as the firm's overall performance, and these are represented by 
the positive partial denvahves. 
3. Compensation Schemes 
3.1 Pareto-Optimal Effort Allocation 
We first consider the Pareto-Optimal effort allocation of each 
department. Pareto-Optimality here means that we get the 
maximum residual for the firm a s  a whole. The marketing 
department should consider not only the total amount of its 
effort (i.e., e,, + el,) but also its allocation. The same applies to 
the manufactumg department. The social welfare surplus is 
The Pareto-Optimal effort combination is denoted by eP - (&,, 
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e;,, e?,, e5,), and satisfies f(e4 - cl(eP) - c2(eP) 2 0 I t  is 
assumed that $ is an Interior polnt such that ef; > 0 for all i, j. 
This is because 6 > 0 1s the only meaningful case where we put 
positive efforts in order to maximlze the social welfare The 
simultaneous equahons for denving $ are: 
As posslble ways to induce Pareto-Optlmal solution, we focus 
in this paper on llnear compensahon schemes in which rewards 
are linear combinations of performance measures. Linear 
compensation schemes are easy to implement There are three 
kinds of constraints to conslder m deslgnlng a compensation 
scheme. First, the compensation scheme should induce the 
Pareto-Optimal effort whlch offers the maxlmum social welfare 
surplus This is called Pareto-Opt~mahty inducing constramt. The 
second 1s non-def~c~t  constra~nt whlch tells that the sum of 
compensations for both departments cannot exceed the total 
output produced: R, + R, I _f; where R, 1s the compensation to 
department L. The last is called partrc~pahon constramt which 
says that each department mll not work for the firm unless its 
reward minus cost is greater than or equal to ~ t s  reservation 
uhlity level: R, - C, 2 0 assuming reservation level bemg 0. 
We say that  (R,, R,) is a full allocation scheme when no 
resldual is left for the principal, i.e., R, + R, = f The firm 
performance, f, can take one of the following two meanmgs. 
First, f 1s the output of efforts from those two departments only. 
In thls case, both departments deserve to ask for full allocahon. 
And full allocation is likely to be an  outcome unless either or 
both departments concede part of their output to the pnnclpal. 
The other context is that f results not only from marketmg and 
manufacturing departments but also from some other factors 
(e g., reputahon of the firm, general adminlstrahve support from 
the company, facility usage, etc.). In the second case, a 'pseudo 
department' can be created to clam the residual. In this paper, 
we mainly consider the first case 
We will now examlne four types of linear compensation 
schemes to see whether they can offer Pareto-Opbmal solution. 
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3.2 Compensation Scheme 1 
We first consider allocatmg the firm's overall output between 
marketing and manufacturing departments. Suppose a, frachon 
off is given to department i Since it is not possible to allocate 
more than what has been produced (non-deficit constraint), we 
have the following conditions for a, and %: 
We restrict, for convenience, our feasible effort allocahon to e 
such that C,(e) > 0 and C2(e) > 0. Then we have the extra 
conditions of 
a,, % > O  
from the participation constraints. Here we use the overall 
output f as a base for compensating each department's effort, 
and we call it compensation scheme 1. We use the overall output 
as a compensation base to induce the cooperation between the 
two interacting departments. Their cooperation may result from 
the incentive to increase the overall output since part of the 
increment wll be allocated to each department. In compensation 
scheme 1, the objective functions of each department are then: 
Therefore the first order necessary conditions for maximization 
(i.e., Nash equilibrium conditions) are: 
Since 0 c a, c 1 and af/ae, > 0, I, j = 1.2, we have 
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From these and equations (1) to (2), we know that the Nash 
equilibrium effort exerted by marketing and manufacturing 
departments under compensation scheme 1 ,  denoted by el, 
satisfies that 
This tells us  that the effort induced by compensation scheme 1 
is less than Pareto-Optimal effort level componenturlse, and let 
u s  call this phenomenon under-effort. Under compensation 
scheme 1 where only the  overall ou tpu t  is used a s  a 
compensation base for each participating department, Pareto- 
Optimal effort allocation cannot be achieved. This free rtder 
problem occurs because each department cannot be rewarded 
fully but partially (a, or cr,) from f, and thus compensation 
scheme 1 cannot induce Pareto-Optimal effort. 
In addition to the under-effort phenomenon, there is a n  
adverse selection problem such that the more talented party 
might leave the firm since it does not want to dilute its reward 
by the other party's bad performance 
3.3 Compensation Scheme 2 
In compensation scheme 2 ,  we may try using each 
department's own performance measure, Vl and V2 (not the 
overall firm performance) as our compensation base in order to 
increase effort level and to avoid effort shortage seen in 
compensation scheme 1. In compensation scheme 2, the 
objective functions of each department are: 
where 6,s are such that full allocabon is achieved. As depicted in 
above equation, the performance measure of department 1, Vl, 
is determined by (ell, e2,), and not influenced by e2,. The cost 
funcbon, C1, is determined by its effort (ell, el,). We can clearly 
see that 
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d ac 
-(6,V, - C,) = --2 < 0,i # J. 
ae, de, 
This is because aVl/ae12 = 0, ac,/ae,, > 0, av2/ae2, = 0, and 
aC2/ae2, > 0. Therefore under compensation scheme 2, each 
department is better off by reducing its effort for helping the 
other department since that incurs cost without any return to 
itself, and thus  the solution will be on the boundary By 
denotlng the effort induced under compensation scheme 2 as 2 
-- ($,, &, $,, s2,), it is derived that 
which does not satisfy Pareto-Optimality condition. This 
indicates tha t  each party tends to be stingy on exerting 
cooperahve effort for the other party. Even though the effort for 
the  other is  beneficial for the company a s  a whole, the  
department is not directly rewarded for its sacrifice and thus 
does not put the cooperative effort. We wll call this phenomenon 
'no cooperative effort'. 
3.4 Compensation Scheme 3 
In compensation scheme 3, we try to use the advantages of 
compensation schemes 1 and 2 by utilizing both f and V, as  
bases for compensahng department 1. In scheme 3, we set the 
objective functions of each department for maximization as  
follows 
As m compensahon scheme 1, (a;, p,) is set in such a way that: 
Here 2 = (3,. g2, 32, e&) denotes the effort induced under 
compensation scheme 3. 
The first order necessary conditions for maximization are: 
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As in the analysis of compensation scheme 2, equations (5) 
and (7) can be simplified as follows: 
Suppose 2 = eP. Then four condikons above become 
df dV2 (a, -1 ) - (e3 )+&-(e3)=0 ,  
ae22 ae22 
df 3 (a, -1)-(e ) = 0 .  
3% 1 
Since eP is assumed to be an intenor point, we denve al = % = 
1 and p1 = P, = 0  from the conditions above. This contradicts the 
non-deficit condition. Therefore we conclude that $ cannot be 
equal to eP, and compensation scheme 3 cannot induce the 
Pareto-Ophmal solution either. 
38 Seoul Journal of Busrness 
3.5 Compensation Scheme 4 
Finally in compensation scheme 4, we enlarge compensation 
base to V; V,, V2) for rewarding each department. V2 is included 
for rewarding department 1. Therefore one department's 
compensation is affected by the other's performance. The 
objective function of department 1 for maximization in 
compensation scheme 4 is: 
Likewise department 2's objective function is 
As in compensation scheme 1, (a1, p,, is set in such a way 
that: 
(a, +a,) f(e4) + (P1 + y2)v1(e4) + (P2 + yl)v2(e4) 5 f(e4), 
4 a l f ( e 4 ) + ~ l ~ l ( e 4 ) + ~ l v 2 ( e  )2c1(e4), 
a2f (e4) + p2v2(e4) + y2vl(e4) 2 c2(e4). 
The first condition above represents the non-deficit constraint. 
And the second and the third ones are the participation 
cons t r a t s  for departments 1 and 2 respectively. Here e4 = (ef,, 
e;,, et2, e;,) denotes the effort induced under compensation 
scheme 4. 
The conditions for Nash equilibrium are. 
In order to satisfy Pareto-Optimality induclng constraint, the 
simultaneous equations above should have eP as a solution. For 
th is ,  we should choose appropriate coefficients for 
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compensation,  (a,, DL, y,, i = 1 ,2) ,  among the  possible 
combinations satisfying the relevant conditions. We first 
substitute P, and y, with a,. Then we get the followings: 
From the Pareto-Optimality conditions, we can derive 
Using these and the substitutions above (equations (12) to 
(1 5)and (16)), we can simpllfy the non-deficlt condition We first 
define the following notahons for simplicity 
Uslng these notations, we can represent the non-deficlt 
condition as: 
For the following analysis of non-deficit condihon, we assume 
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that AB + 0 in order to have half-space as our region of (a,, 
satisfying non-deficit condition. For general forms of V; V,, V2, 
C,, C2), the condition of AB + 0 is not restnctive. An important 
case where AB =/= 0 is not satisfied is that f = V, + V2 In this 
special case, we note that A = B = 0, D < 0, and thus there is no 
(a,, a2) satisfying the non-deficit condition among Pareto- 
Optimality inducing compensation scheme 4. 
Proposition 1. 7'h,e non-defiit cond~twn excludes the pomts of 
(a1, = ~ ~ 1 , 0 ~ , ~ 0 , 1 ~ , ~ 1 , 1 ~ 1 .  
This proposition can be easily proved using the fact that 8 is 
an interior point and the functionsJ C,, and V, are increasing. 
Defining 
E = [c, - dell(eP) V1 - dC1 / de12(eP) V21(eP), 
dV1lde,l(eP) dv2/de12(eP) 
the inequality representing the participation constraint for 
department 1 ([aJ+ P1Vl + y1v2](a 2 C , ( a )  can be represented 
as 
Likewise the corresponding constraint for department 2 in terms 
of q, is 
From these participation constraints, we can derive the 
following charactenstic. 
Propositon 2. The (a,, q,) sattsfy ing parfic~pation constraints 
should include (1,O) and (0,l). 
Proof: Since _Ad 2 ~ ~ ( 4 ,  we have A 2 E. This implies that 
(a,, %) = (1,O) should be m the region where the participabon 
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constraint for department 1 is sahsfied. The same logic applies 
to the case of department 2 
We are now going to show that the point, (E/A, FIB), is in the 
region of Aa, + Bcq! 2 D, which defmes the non-deficit region. 
Proposition 3. (E E)  sa t i s -es  the non-de-cit constraint of 
A '  B 
Aa, + Bcq! 5 D. 
Proof: 
The last inequality is equal to [C, + c2](d 5 _Ad, which is 
assumed from the existence of eP 
We should note that Proposihons 1 through 3 hold regardless 
of the signs of A, B, D, E, and F. We see that the (a,, a2) 
combinations in the shaded area of Figure 1 could Induce the 
Pareto-Optimal effort allocation vla compensabon scheme 4. We 
m11 call thls region of (a,, cq!) a feasible triangle. Assume that D > 
0 from now on. For the cases where D I 0, we have the feasible 
tnangle in different forms but can analyze in a simllar manner. 
Due to the posltive first order partial derivatives, we have 0 < D < 
A, 0 < D < B, and thus the intersections along the axes of the 
non-deficit constramt are smaller than 1 .  Thus, 
We can also refine the feasible triangle using the follomng 
proposition. 
Proposition 4. When D > 0, w e  have E > D - B and F > D - A. 
That is, (&,, 4) achievrng Pareto-Optimalrty should satisfy (&,, 4) 
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Figure 1. Feasible Triangle 
Proof: Let X be the point intersected by Aa, + B q  = D and cq, = 
1. Then we get X = ((D - B)/A,  1 ) .  Since E - (D - B) = c,(& > 0, we 
have 
This implies that &c 1.  Likewise, we get F/B > (D - A ) / B  and 
thus &, < 1 .  And the result follows. 
We have shown m Proposition 4 that all (a,, q) combinahons 
induclng Pareto-Optimal solutions should satisfy a, < 1 when D 
> 0. The (a,, q) combinations on the line segment (G, H) are the 
frachons by which Pareto-Ophmal surplus are fully distributed 
between the two departments with no residual. They are Pareto- 
Optimal full allocation compensation schemes. The polnt J 
represents the case where both departments are rewarded just 
to meet their reservation levels. According to Proposition 2, J 
should be m the third quadrant as  m Figure 1. Suppose M in the 
feasible triangle is chosen as  a compensation scheme coefficient, 
then the Pareto-Optimal effort allocation is induced (with 
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appropriate P, and y,) but  there occurs posltlve amount of 
residual. Now let us  check the sign of (Pi, x) 
Proposition 5. In the optimal compensation scheme 4 where D 
> 0 ,  w e  should give positive reward accord~ng to each 
department's individual performance. That is, (DL, yi) > (0,  0 )  for i = 
1 . 2  whenD>O. 
Proof: Now using the Pareto-Opbmallty conditions (equations 
(16)) and &, c 1 from Proposition 4, we get 
Therefore we have shown that  the coefficients for each 
department's performance in compensabon scheme 4 inducing 
Pareto-Optimality should be positive, that is. (PI, P2, yl, y2) > 0 
when D > 0 .  
And we finaly summame one of our main results in Theorem 1 
Theorem 1. Among the four reward schemes, compensation 
scheme 4 is the only one which induces the Pareto-Optunal effort, 
ep. 
This theorem says that compensation scheme 4 lets both 
departments to share the largest pie and thus is Pareto-better 
than other compensation schemes. The reason for this 1s that 
each department had better help the other slnce its reward 
comes partly from the performance of the other. Here, not only 
~ t s  own performance (VJ but also the other party's performance 
(5) in addition to the overall output, _f; are included m a base for 
rewarding L. In compensation scheme 4, one department's 
helplng the other is consistent w t h  increasing ~ t s  own reward. 
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In case D I 0, the feasible tnangle does not contain (0, 0) for 
(&,, a,). This implies t ha t  with only (V,, V2) a s  a linear 
compensation base, we can not achieve the Pareto-Optimal 
solution. In this  case,  we need f i n  addition to a linear 
combination of V, and V2 for inducing the Pareto-Optimal 
solution. Even when D > 0 and thus E I 0 and F I 0, full 
al locat~on compensation is  not achievable with a linear 
combination of V, and V2 while excluding the  overall 
performance, f; 
The exact compensation scheme coefficients (represented by a 
pomt m the feasible tnangle) can be determined by a bargaming 
process among the participants. Regarding the equilibnum of 
the bargaining, readers can refer to Eliasberg (1986). Nash 
(1950), and Kala and Smordinsky (1975). 
4. Numerical Example 
In this section, a numencal example is considered. The overall 
output function, cost functions, and individual performance 
measures are given as follows. 
f = 15 + e12e2, - [(ell - 112 + (e22 - 112 + (e12 - 112 + (e2, - U2], 
C1 = el, +el,, 
C2 = e2, + e2,, 
Vl = 4 -(ell + e2, - 212, 
V2 = 4 - (e,, + el, - 212, 
O l e ,  l l , ~ , ~  =l ,2 .  
In f, we can see the effects of inter-departmental help The 
separate effects are represented by - (e12 - 1)2 and - (ezl - I ) ~ ,  
and joint effect is denoted by the term, e12e2,. 
4.1 Pareto-Optimal Solution 
Let n = f - C1 - C2. We can see that C, is a linear function and 
thus convex. Also V, is concave and increasing function on the 
domam. We can venfl the concavity off using the Hessian off. 
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The first order necessary conditions for maximizing n are: 
From these four equations, we get the following Pareto- 
Optimal effort allocabon: 
The overall output, costs, and soclal welfare(z) are: 
f (eP) = 15.5, c1(eP) = 1.5, c2(eP) = 1 5, n(eP) = 12.5 
4.2 Compensation Scheme 1 
For simplicity, let us  use the fair partition of the total output 
m compensation scheme 1 by taking a, = q = 0.5. Then the 
resldual for each department are: 
Suppose that two departments play a simultaneous game, 1.e.. 
they put their effort simultaneously, not sequentially. Then we 
get the following four equations for a Nash equilibrium. 
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From these equabons, we get: 
Thus using compensabon scheme 1,  we lose the social welfare 
by 1.5 behind the Pareto-Ophmal solution. The efforts induced 
from compensation scheme 1 is less than those from the Pareto- 
Optimal solution componentwlse, and thus  the free-rider 
problem occurs. 
4.3 Compensation Scheme 2 
The utility of department 1 is: 
Since aa,/ael, = -1 < 0, ef2 = 0. Likewise, we get eil  =O. 
Choosing 6 s  such that we have a full allocation scheme, we 
derive 61 = i$ =13/6, 4l = 1, and 4, = 1 .  We can summarize the 
results as follows: 
Thus we are still 1.5 behind the Pareto-Optimal solution. 
A g m ,  the cooperation for the other department becomes smaller 
than that in the Pareto-Opbmal solution. 
4.4 Compensation Scheme 3 
In compensation scheme 3, the utillty of department i is: 
Using the symmetry of functions Involved V; C,, V,), let us restrict 
our attention to the case of a, = cq, and p1 = &. The equations for 
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maximizing a, and % are: 
2a(l - e l , )  + 2P(1 - e l ,  - e,,) = 1, (191 
a(e2, - 2e12 + 2) = 1, (20) 
2a( l -  e,,) + 2P(1- e,, - el , )  = 1, (2 1 )  
a(e,,  - 2eZl + 2) = 1 .  (22) 
From the equations (20) and 22). 
Since a I 0.5 from the non-deficit condition, we have 2 - l / a  I 
0 and thus get 
Then from the equations (19) and (21), we can denve 
Thus given (a, p), the effort induced in compensation scheme 3 
is 
We can easily derive 
We will show that, for any pair of (a, p), the a in compensation 
scheme 3 is worse than the Pareto-Optimal solution. It suffices 
to show that 
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Denotmg x = a + p and g(x) = (2x -  1 ) / ( 2 2 ) ,  we see that g(x) < 1.5 
for every real number x since 3 2  - 2x + 1 = 3(x - 1 / 3 ) ~  + 2 / 3  > 0 .  
Thus. 
Actually the valid (a ,  P) for consideration from non-deficit 
constraint should satisfy the followng. 
In the special case of a = 0.25 and P = 1 ,  we get f =12.68 and n: 
= 1 1.48, which is worse than the Pareto-Optimal solution. 
4.5 Compensation Scheme 4 
We should first find the appropnate coefficients (a,, P,, y,) for 
compensation scheme 4 which induce the Pareto-Optimal 
solution. We can easily derive the follourmgs: 
Now we check the constrant ( * ) for compensation scheme 4: 
This is satisfied since the left hand side is 15 and J I ~  = 15.5. 
We can calculate: 
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The symmetric Pareto-Optlmal full allocahon scheme 1s when 
4.6 Summary Table of the Example 
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 
Reward to dept 1 0 5f vl 0 25f+V1 1/32f+31/32Vl+31/32V2 
Reward to dept 2 0.5f V, o.25f+V2 1/32f+31/32V1+31/32V2 
el (O,O,O,O) (l,l,o,O) (0 6.0.6.0.0) (0.5.0 5,1,1) 
f 11 13 12 68 15 5 
Cl+C2 0 2 1 2  3 
II 11 11 11 48 12 5 
5. Connections to Previous Works 
We can apply our method to get the Pareto-Ophmal solution 
for the following sample cases where coordination among 
multiple parhes is required We took the same notations in the 
onglnal papers for comparison purpose. 
5.1 Multi-Echelon Inventory 
We can apply our analysls to (Clark and Scarf 1960).  Let VF = 
Cn(x,, w,) and @ = min,,o[c(z) + a I,"gn-,(x, + z - t)+(t)dtl. 
Substituting V ;  = b; + An(x2 ) ,  we can use ( V F ,  V;) a s  a 
compensation scheme for echelon 1 and 2 for n - th stage 
decision. By allocating alRn - PIVF to echelon 1 and &Rn - p2V; 
to echelon 2 where Rn 1s the sales revenue from the outslde 
consumers, we can induce the optimal decislon of each echelon 
by settlng the coefficients appropnately. 
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5.2 Cooperative Quantity Discount Policy 
For the model of Kohli and Park (1989), let Vl = n(x)  and V2 = 
R- C(x), where R = prD is the sales revenue from the outside 
consumers per unit time and pr = retail price per unit. Then by 
allocating PIV1 + ylV2 to the seller and &V2 + y2Vl to the buyer, 
where 
we can induce both the seller and the buyer to follow the Pareto- 
Optimal solution. Any value of P1 = yl urlth & = % = 1 - P1 in the 
following band induce the Pareto-Optimal soluhon: 
5.3 Channel Coordination Thru Quantity Discount 
Regarding the model in Weng (1995), we can take Vl (p) = (p - 
c)D(x) - S a x j / Q  - &Q/2 and V&, 9) = (x - p1Dt-d - SbD(xj/Q - 
hbQ/2. Then allocating q(Vl + V2) and (1 - q)(Vl + V2) to the seller 
and to the buyer respectively, we can induce the optimal 
solution by choosing q such that 
where q,,.,h = Gg/G$ and q, = 1 - G,+/G;, and GJ is the jolnt 
optimal objechve function value. 
6. Practical Implications 
When there is no relevance between the two departments, 
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mutual help is not needed for Pareto-Optimality. However in an 
industry with highly positive cross impacts, we had better 
induce each other's cooperation m order to maximize the pie for 
distribution. We have to utilize the characteris tic 
Here, one department should devote some of its effort for the 
other since the effort may be extremely beneficial to the f m ' s  
overall output. Thus, a compensation mechanism which gives an 
incentive to help each other is needed. 
Intuitively we can suggest both the firm's overall output and a 
department's performance as a compensation base. But it was 
shown that this kind of compensation schemes (compensation 
scheme 3) cannot induce full amount of cross-helping effort 
which is required for Pareto-Optimality. We thus recommended a 
compensation scheme which combines the overall output and 
both partles' performances altogether as  a compensation base. 
This result may have a practical implication in setting up a 
compensation scheme to induce cooperative team work. 
We now take the case of Salomon Brothers Inc. as a pracbcal 
example. In October, 1994, Salomon introduced a new 
compensation scheme for managing directors in customer 
businesses. In the new scheme, managing directors were 
supposed to be p a d  a f ~ e d  minimum amount (average of 35% of 
1994 pay) plus 40% of the earnings of the chent-driven business 
in excess of an after-tax return to shareholders (initially set at 
7%). With the new pay system, Salomon began managing its 
client-driven business as a single integrated global operation 
using one pay pool instead of a group of 1 1  related but separate 
businesses. As  a result, managing directors in Salomon's 
customer businesses have their pay linked to the performance of 
a wde variety of businesses, rangmg from investment banking 
to equities to fured income. The motives for this scheme may be 
risk-pooling effect among employees and increasing the 
performance of the company as  a whole and thus increasing 
stockholders' value. It was expected that under the new scheme 
each director would have the mcentive to pass over a valuable 
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information to those in other divisions since doing so would 
increase the firm's overall profit. The effort for increasing the 
overall profit f would be induced and this would benefit the 
stock prices Introduction of the new scheme can be interpreted 
as  the transition from compensahon scheme 2 to compensation 
scheme 1 in our model. Reward in the new system can be 
represented as  rn + 0.41f- F ] + ,  where rn is the mlnimum payment 
assured ,  F i s  the  flxed amount  to be handed over to 
stockholders, and [A+ = x if x 2 0 and 0 otherwise. 
Contrary to the expectations, the overall profit and stock 
prices fell sharply(from $52 1994 to $34 May, 1995) 
undermining the  company value a s  a whole, and many 
competitive traders and investment bankers left the company. 
These are under-effort phenomenon and the adverse selection 
respectively, and could have been expected from the analysis of 
compensation scheme 1 in  th is  paper. New executives' 
compensation in 1996 came to be based on a combination of the 
firm's return on equity, the profits generated by each particular 
business unit and mdividual productivity. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we showed that in order to achieve the Pareto- 
Optlmal solution, we need V; V,, V2) as a linear compensation 
base. That is, the reward to department 1 should be dependent 
not only on the overall performancev) and its own performance 
(V,) but also on the other party's outcome (V,). Under the above 
compensation scheme, we could induce the Pareto-Optimal 
solution smce one department had better help the other for its 
own benefit. By using the reward calculated from linear 
combinahon of V; V,, V2) with appropnate coefficients, we could 
exactly align the incenhves of all the parties involved. We showed 
that in general utilizing a part of V; V,, V2) as a compensation 
base could not Induce the Pareto-Optimal full allocation. 
Conflicts among participants usually Involve in fightlng over 
limited resources. There are several cases where each devlsion 
wthm a firm tries to take larger portion of a limlted resources 
such a s  manufacturing capacity, human resources, and 
financial resources. Even to these cases, our compensation 
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scheme can also be applied by inducmg each other's sacnfice for 
its own benefit. 
To make one participant's goal congruent to that of the other 
participant. we might also suggest other mechanisms than 
reward schemes such  a s  organization design and  
communication among the participants. In implementing 
compensation scheme 4 in the highly cross-impact mdustry, we 
may have dficulty in figunng the appropriate forms of V, even 
though C, is known widely. In this case, we should consider 
combining these two closely related departments (organization 
design). If we successfully combine those two parties and once 
they have the same objectwe, then we may mduce the first best 
solution. Currently, several firms use task force or project team 
in many instances where close cooperations are necessary for 
success. And they try to have the team members share the same 
goal throughout the project. This trend is consistent with the 
suggestion made in this paper Also we can encourage corporate 
culture and communication among the p&icipants which make 
the members value cooperation highly (communication). This 
approach is extremely profitable since it covers more than just 
monetary compensation. And there are lots of companies whose 
successes are mainly dependent on organization design and/or 
communication mechanism. 
Although a reward scheme seems to be a good mechanism for 
resolving conflict and inducing cooperation among parties 
involved, we should study in depth the conditions that limit its 
effectiveness. Emplncal studies testing the validity of our model 
and further research on which mechanism is more effective in 
inducing cooperation should follow in the future. 
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